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SELLING NEBRASKA'S WATER:
WATER SALES, TRANSFERS
AND EXPORTS

-
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]. David Aiken
Historically, western states have been free to prohibit water exports, and most
states have done so. This changed abruptly in 1982, when the U.S. Supreme Court in its
Sporhase decision invalidated Nebraska's groundwater export statute. After Sporhase,
states could no longer simply prohibit the export of water, so the likelihood that water
could be purchased or appropriated for export increased. In 1987 legislation was introduced to aggressively seek interstate buyers for Nebraska water. In the face of stormy
opposition, the legislation was successfully recast as a study of water exports and transfers. The water exports study, however, contained the original premise: that selling
Nebraska water is inevitable and could be a state financial bonanza. Analysis of the
issue indicates it is not clear that selling Nebraska water is in the state's best interests,
particularly if the sale proceeds are used to construct new irrigation projects, thus
adding to surplus crop production.

Introduction
Traditionally, western states, including Nebraska, have been able to
prevent export of their water to other states, reserving it for in-state uses. In
1982 the U.S. Supreme Court, in the landmark decision of Nebraska v.
Sporhase, invalidated a feature of Nebraska's groundwater export statute
which discriminated against out-of-state users. The Sporhase decision
increased the likelihood for development of increased water exports between
states and interstate sale of water rights. Some Nebraskans see the Sporhase
decision as an economic development opportunity, while others see it as a
threat to the state's long-term interests. This issue is complex and controversial, and Nebraska's policy response to the Sporhase decision must take
both factors into consideration.
This chapter examines Nebraska water policy regarding water transfers
and exports as well as the policies of western states in general prior to the
Sporhase dccision. The Sporhase decision is examined in some detail, as is
water export litigation after Sporhase. The Nebraska policy response to
Sporhase - a preview of the political controversy that will attend water
export and transfer legislative debates in 1989 and beyond - is also profiled.
Finally, water export and transfer policy alternatives are evaluated.
While the thought of exporting water may strike most Nebraska citizens
as outrageous, many small-scale transfers could occur with little adverse
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effect on Nebraska. The likelihood of Los Angeles, Phoenix or Denver
importing massive amounts of water from Nebraska is remote, at least within
the foreseeable future. If water exports occur they will most likely inVolve
small quantities moved over short distances.

Making water rights marketable will not signal the end
of irrigated agriculture in Nebraska; in fact it may provide
new opportunities to resolve a variety of water conflicts.
The notion of buying and selling water rights has always aroused contro_
versy in Nebraska, raising the specter of cities and industries drying up the
irrigated areas of the state. But, in fact, allowing water rights to be purchased
would broaden the water management options available to Nebraska
resource managers, and could even result in enhanced protection of fish and
wildlife. Even if municipal and industrial uses were doubled in Nebraska, the
water could be supplied with about ten percent of the water currently used in
irrigation. Making water rights marketable will not signal the end of irrigated
agriculture in Nebraska; in fact it may provide new opportunities to resolve a
variety of water conflicts.
In considering water export policy alternatives, one must realize that the
Sporhase decision does not represent the last word on water exports law.
That legal issue will continue to be developed through additional state legislation and litigation. There is little need to immediately enact legislation
either promoting exports or limiting them to protect Nebraska's interests,
but this would send a political signal that Nebraska is friendly or hostile
toward exporting its water. Citizens and policy makers must avoid simply ,
concluding that water exports and transfers are either terrible or the solution
to all our problems. The truth lies between these extremes.

Background
While the issue of water exports and transfers appears to have been
thrust upon Nebraskans with the Sporhase decision, additional factors have
contributed to the development of the issue and how it will affect
Nebraskans. Nebraska's abundance of groundwater means that the state is a
potential source of water for more arid states. Nebraska already has a
turbulent history regarding interbasin surface water transfers that may make
the issue of interstate water transfers more controversial. Finally, because
Nebraska is the only western state that prohibits the sale of irrigation water
rights for uses other than irrigation, proposals to sell water rights within
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Nebraska and to users in other states will generate strong political
resistance.

Water Use and Policy
How water exports and water rights transfers affect Nebraska depends
upon the state's current water availability and use. While Nebraska is a semiarid state, its groundwater availability has created unique water laws and
policy development and has made the state a potential source of water for
other states. Nebraska's water policies have emphasized water development
and use rather than resource protection. Policies encouraging water exports
would be consistent with this tradition, although export policies have been
vigorously opposed by agricultural groups. Policies adopting a resource
protcction objective would discourage water exports, but they have also been
opposed in other contexts by irrigation and water development interests.

Sources and Use
Nebraska is categorized as a semiarid state because the western twothirds of the state needs supplemental water for row-crop production. About
90 percent of all water used in Nebraska is used for irrigation. Average
annual precipitation ranges from thirty-four inches in the southeast corner
of Nebraska to sixteen inches in the Panhandle. Nebraska contains thirteen
river basins, about 24,000 miles of streams and rivers, and many small dams
and farm ponds.
Eighteen large reservoirs (each storing at least 25,000 acre1
feet of water) collectively store more than three million acre-feet of water,
principally for irrigation. Of the estimated seven million acres irrigated in
Nebraska, approximately one million are irrigated with surface water.
Surface water is the major source of water for power production, supplying
all the water for hydropower generation and sixty-five percent of the water
used for power plant cooling. Surface water is less important for other water
uses and only provides water for approximately twenty-two percent of all
municipal use, sev(:~nteen percent of rural domestic and livestock usc, and

Nebraska's water policies have emphasized water
development and use rather than resource protection.
Policies encouraging water exports would be consistent
with this tradition, although export policies have been
vigorously opposed by agricultural groups.
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twenty-seven percent of irrigation. Surface water is also used for fish and
wildlife habitat and recreation.
Groundwater is Nebraska's hidden treasure. Nearly three billion acre-feet
of groundwater underlie Nebraska; more than is found in any other state and
1,000 times the amount of water in Nebraska's large reservoirs. However
groundwater recharge rates are very low and depend on rainfall. I~
Nebraska, recharge rates range from less than one inch per surface acre
annually in regions with heavy, tighter soils to three inches per surface acre
annually in regions with lighter, sandy soils. The three billion acre-feet of
groundwater represent thousands of years of recharge from rainfall.
Groundwater is widely available in Nebraska: Irrigation wells are located in
every county and reliable domestic wells exist in every part of the state.
At the same time, groundwater depletion is occurring in several parts of
the state, notably in the Blue River Basin, Central Platte River Basin, and
Republican River Basin, all intensively irrigated areas that rely on
groundwater. Groundwater pollution is a recent problem, with nitrates and
other agricultural chemicals being detected in most irrigated areas of the
state (Exner and Spalding 1987). Groundwater accounts for seventy-eight
percent of all municipal water use, eighty-three percent of rural domestic
and livestock use, all self-supplied industrial uses, and seventy-three percent
of irrigation use. Groundwater also supports the flow of many Nebraska
streams and lakes during dry periods.
Many Nebraskans, particularly farmers, think of Nebraska as being a
relatively dry state because of its recurring droughts and low precipitation. In
fact the state is water rich, particularly compared to other western states.
Nebraska has streamflow, particularly from the Sandhills, that would make
any other western state envious. Groundwater, however, accounts for most
of the water for virtually every water use. Nebraska's groundwater resources
are without parallel in the United States, both in quantity and quality. This
underground treasure represents an abundant resource for instate use, a
resource most citizens believe should be carefully guarded against potential
exploitation by out-of-state users.
Surface Water Laws and Issues. Nebraska is one of the seventeen arid
and semiarid western states to adopt statutory laws governing the use of surface water. In Nebraska, appropriation permits (water rights) must be
obtained from the Nebraska Department of Water Resources (DWR) to
secure the legal right to divert water from a lake or stream. Similar permits
must be obtained to construct and to operate surface water reservoirs.
These surface water appropriations are administered by the DWR on the
basis that "first in time is first in right." This means that when water is
insufficient to supply the needs of all appropriators, those with the most
recent priority dates (those who acquired their appropriations most recently)
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The protection of environmental water uses (such as
for fish and wildlife) and the funding of new surface
water development projects are the most visible
surface water policy issues facing Nebraskans.

---------------------------------------------------------must stop withdrawing water until the needs of senior appropriators have
been satisfied. The DWR issues closing orders to junior appropriators
virtually every irrigation season.
Thc prior appropriation doctrine protects the rights of first users at the
expense of later users. The most senior water rights represent the most
secure water supply. This so-called rule of priority is an essential feature of
the appropriation doctrine, applied by all western states to surface water and
by most western states (excluding Nebraska) to groundwater.
The protection of environmental water uses (such as for fish and wildlife)
and the funding of new surface water development projects are the most
visible surface water policy issues facing Nebraskans. Traditionally, Nebraska
surface water laws have not recognized instream flows (water rights to leave
water in a stream for fish and wildlife protection rather than to divert the
water from the stream for irrigation) as a legally protected water use.
Controversial legislation authorizing instream flow appropriations for fish
and wildlife protection was finally enacted in 1984, but only after a bitter
fight between environmental and irrigation interests (Aiken 1987). Further
irrigation-environmental disputes have prevented instream appropriations
from being granted.
Instream flows for fISh and wildlife purposes often conflict with new
irrigation projects. Federal funding for those projects has diminished
substantially, raising the possibility that any major water projects in
Nebraska will have to depend on state financing. This would constitute a
major water policy change, requiring both a constitutional amendment to
allow the state to incur debt to finance water projects and a political consensus that new water projects are needed and can be developed without
disrupting the environment.
Interbasin Transfers. Interbasin water transfers represent a specific area
of Nebraska's surface water laws and policies, especially water exports and
water-right sales. Nebraska water right statutes were interpreted by the
Nebraska Supreme Court in 1936 as prohibiting the transfer of water from
one river basin to another (Osterman v. Central Nebraska Public Power &
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Irrigation District, 131 Neb. 356, 268 N.W. 334 [1936]). This decision
thwarted the desires of irrigators in the Blue and Republican river basins to
divert water from the Platte River. The legislative representatives frorn
regions south of the Platte River made several unsuccessful attempts to
overrule the Osterman decision through legislation authorizing transbasin
diversions. These trans basin diversion proposals were the major theme of
several legislative sessions, from 1943 to 1953, producing bitter and divisive
political battles, as the regions north of the Platte River opposed transbasin
diversion and the regions to the south supported it (Oeltjen and others
1971).
The Osterman decision was overruled in the 1980 Little Blue I decision
when the Nebraska Supreme Court reinterpreted Nebraska appropriation
statutes as authorizing, not prohibiting, interbasin surface water transfers.
Little Blue I triggered a race for Platte River water rights that is still Occurring: Platte valley irrigation interests battle promoters of irrigation projects
in the Republican and Blue river valleys and environmentalists who want to
protect Platte River flows for fish and wildlife (Aiken 1987).
Nebraska's surface water policies may fairly be characterized as develop_
ment oriented. Appropriation statutes were adopted in 1895 to legally
encourage irrigation development. Those statutes have been little changed
since their original adoption, although public attitudes toward resource use
and environmental protection have changed dramatically. Water wars pitting
irrigators against environmentalists dominate the surface water policy
agend.'1. Nebra'ika surface water policies encourage resource use rather than
resource protection, an attitude Nebraskans may have to change if they wish
to protect Nebraska water resources from exportation to other states.
Groundwater Laws and Issues. As indicated, groundwater is the major
source of water in Nebraska and supplies most water uses except for power
production. Nebraska does not apply the doctrine of prior appropriation to
groundwater; it relies instead on the courts to resolve groundwater disputes
between landowners. While this common law approach faIls short of
comprehensive management of a vital public resource, it mirrors the
experience of other western states with extensive groundwater supplies:
California, Arizona, and Texa'i. In all other states, groundwater supplies are
so limited that legislation is required to settle frequent groundwater disputes,
just as appropriation statutes are required to handle the recurring disputes
over surface water use.
Groundwater supplies arc being depleted in several areas of Nebraska,
including the Blue River basin, the Central Platte River basin, the
Republican River basin, and the Alliance and O'Neill areas. Groundwater
withdrawals may be reducing streamflow in the Republican River basin and
may reduce Platte River flow during the irrigation season. Also, groundwater
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Nebraska groundwater policy is virtually a blank slate.
An unusual abundance of groundwater has given Nebraska
policymakers the luxury of avoiding difficult political
decisions to protect this critical public resource.

pollution from the use of agricultural chemicals is occurring throughout the
irrigated areas of the state and may ultimately extend to the streams such
groundwater feeds. But, legislation giving local natural resource districts the
option of establishing regulations to control groundwater depletion and
pllllution from agricultural water uses generally has not led to groundwater
controls. New groundwater quality legislation giving the Nebraska Department of Environmental Control authority to establish special groundwater
quality protection areas is at least a year from being implemented and several
years from being implemented statewide (Exner and Spaulding 1987). No
policies exist for working with surface/groundwater conflicts, although
concerns regarding how further diversions from the Platte River will affect
Platte valley municipal well fields are a significant element of the current
Platte River water war.
Nebraska groundwater policy is virtually a blank slate. An unusual
abundance of groundwater has given Nebraska policymakers the luxury of
avoiding difficult political decisions to protect this critical public resource.
Nebraska groundwater policies are even less well-developed than Nebraska
surface water policies, and they are geared less to resource protection than
to resource development and use. Nebraskans will have to adopt new political attitudes emphasizing resource protection rather than resource development and use if they are to protect Nebraska water from export to other
states. Alternatively, the extension of Nebraska's traditional attitudes of
encouraging water development and use at the expense of resource protection is consistent with policies encouraging the export of Nebraska water to
other states. This possibility has already been opposed by irrigation groups,
which have sought to maintain the instate development orientation in
Ncbra<;ka water policies.

Water Transfers and Exports
To understand the legal and political dimensions of the Sporhase
decision, an understanding of water transfers and water export policies is
needed. Western states, including Nebraska, have traditionally restricted
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water exports pursuant to U.S. Supreme Court decisions authorizing water
embargoes. Most western states, excluding Nebraska, have allowed the
buying and selling of water rights principally to allow municipalities and
industries to obtain needed water supplies from irrigators. The Sporhase
decision has forced western states, including Nebraska, to modify their water
export restrictions. The Sporhase decision may also force Nebraska to mOdify
its policies regarding water right transfers.
Water transfers refer to instate interbasin transfers of surface water and
instate transfers of groundwater. An interbasin surface water transfer is a
transfer from one of Nebraska's thirteen river basins to another. The move_
ment of surface water within a river basin is not legally considered to be a
transfer, whercas an intcrbasin transfer is legally subject to additional
requirements and conditions before approval of such a transfer is given.
What legally constitutes a transfer of groundwater is not clear under
Nebraska law. The most narrow possibility is that any groundwater pumped
off the tract of land from which the water was withdrawn is considered a
transfer. The broadest possibility is that all the land overlying a groundwater
basin or aquifer is considered overlying land, which would allow groundwater
to be transferred over large areas. Neither Ncbraska statutes nor Nebraska
Supreme Court decisions address this issue, although groundwater transfers
for municipal, rural domestic, and industrial purposes are authorized if a
Department of Water Resources permit has been obtained. Thus, irrigation
is the only major use for which groundwater transfers is not defined.
Water exports refer to the transfer of surface or groundwater out of
Nebraska. Water right transfers refer to the sale of water rights from one
user to another. In the typical transaction a municipality or industry
purchases the water rights of an irrigator and uses the water formerly used by
the irrigator for municipal or industrial purposes. The seller loses the right
to continue water use, while the buyer obtains the right to use water with the
seller's relatively senior priority date. Water rights are typically purchased
when there is little or no unappropriated water available for new municipal
or industrial uses. Water right transfers may be instate water right sales or
interstate (that is, export) water right sales.
The distinction between water transfers, water exports, and water right
sales is important because the Sporhase decision may be interpreted as
requiring the same rules for each type of activity, whether instate or interstate. Currently, a state is likely to have differcnt legal rules governing water
transfers, water exports, and water right sales. Occasionally the term water
transfers will be used to refer collectively to instate water transfers, water
exports, and water right sales.
Western Water Export Policies. Western states generally have restricted
or prohibited water exports in order to reserve water for instate uses.
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Common restrictions have included: requiring legislative approval before an
xport water right could be granted; requiring that the state seeking to
~port water reciprocally authorize the export of its water into other states;
or flatly prohibiting exports. These legislative restrictions made the movement of water between states difficult to accomplish.
Resolution of Interstate Water Use Conflicts. While western states traditionally have discouraged water exports, interstate water use conflicts have
nonetheless arisen. The typical dispute involves the diversion of water in an
upstream state, which reduces streamflow into a downstream state. Such
conflicts have been resolved either through interstate compacts, where states
negotiate water use agreements, or through litigation, where the U.S.
Supreme Court equitably apportions the disputed water between states.
Coal Slurry Pipeline. A new element in interstate water use arose in the
late 1970s when South Dakota announced a plan to sell 20,000 acre-feet of
water from federal Missouri River reservoirs to the Energy Transportation
System<;, Inc., (ETSI) coal slurry pipeline company. ETSI proposed to grind
Wyoming coal into dust, combine the coal dust with South Dakota water,
and pipe the resulting coal slurry to electric utilities in Arkansas. South
Dakota received $2 million for the initial water appropriation, with subsequent annual payments of $3 million until major pipeline construction
began, at which time payments would increase to $12 million per year. The
money received from ETSI would be used to fund water development
projects in South Dakota, including rural water system development. The
coal slurry pipeline project was abandoned when delays resulting from
lawsuits filed by downstream states, including Nebra<;ka, made the project
impractical. The ETSI case was ultimately decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court in 1988, the court ruling that ETSI had sought water use permits from
the wrong federal agency.
In analyzing the water sale agreement between South Dakota and ETSI,
one fact becomes clear: South Dakota was selling ETSI more than just
water; it was also selling its political support for the coal slurry pipeline

The millions of dollars South Dakota would have
received for selling water, had the pipeline been
constructed, led some in Nebraska to perceive selling
water as a financial opportunity, particularly
to fund water project development.
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project. While ETSI needed state water rights to withdraw water from the
federal Oahe Reservoir for the pipeline, it also needed federal approval
However, states generally do not require cash payments as a condition fo;
issuing new water rights. The cash payments made to South Dakota repre_
sented compensation for state political support of a controversial water-use
project.
The coal slurry pipeline proposal raised many legal and policy issues
regarding interstate water uses, most of which remain unanswered. Signifi_
cantly, the millions of dollars South Dakota would have received for selling
water, had the pipeline been constructed, led some in Nebraska to perceive
selling water as a financial opportunity, particularly to fund water project
development.
Nebraska Water Export Policies. Prior to the 1981 Sporhase deCision,
Nebraska statutes required legislative approval for surface water exports and
reciprocity for groundwater exports. Reciprocity means that the state that
would receive Nebraska groundwater would be required to authorize the
export of its groundwater into Nebraska. Nebraska prohibited instate interbasin transfers of surface water for any purpose prior to the 1980 Little Blue
I decision, authorized instate groundwater transfers only for municipal purposes, and did not authorize water right sales. Thus Nebraska law prior to
Sporhase was very restrictive regarding the movement of water instate and
interstate.

Water Right Transfers
The second major legal issue raised by Sporhase is water right transfers,
or the buying and selling of water rights. In virtually every western state any
entity may purchase water rights and change both the location and the purpose of water use. This means the seller is selling the right to use water.
Most water right sales are from irrigators to industries or municipalities.
Industries and municipalities are interested in purchasing irrigation
appropriations because water supplies have been fully appropriated (that is,
there is no water left for allocation to new water users). And even if the
industry or municipality acquired a new appropriation, it would be the first
junior appropriator issued a closing order when streamflow (or groundwater
supplies) could not meet all appropriative need.,. Therefore, industries or
municipalities that need water purchase rights from irrigators and convert
those water rights to municipal or industrial uses in different locations.
Typically, irrigation water rights are purchased because more irrigation
rights are available for purchase than any other kind. Also, the appropriations with the earliest priority dates tend to be irrigation rights, and
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appropriations with early priority dates are the most valuable because they
represent the most secure water supply.
Effect on Irrigation. Water rights transfers are controversial among
irrigators, because irrigation water sales result in irrigation (and irrigators)
being displaced by municipal and industrial water uses. Farmers and ranchers
see their industry being diminished to satisfy the water needs of
municipalities and industries. This concern is probably misplaced, because
even if western municipal and industrial water uses doubled, only about ten
percent of western irrigation water rights would need to be transferred to
them. ThU'i, although massive purchases of water rights by municipalities and
industries could significantly affect irrigation, they would not displace
irrigated agriculture.
Return Flows. Water rights transfers are also controversial because of
the return flows issue. When water is diverted for irrigation, less than half
the amount diverted is actually consumed in crop production. The remaining
water returns to the stream or groundwater aquifer as return flows and is
available for reuse by other irrigators and water users. When irrigation water
rights are sold, only the amount of water that has been consumed in irrigation can be transferred to the new use; the return flows must be maintained.
However, local irrigators and the municipality or industry proposing to
purchase the irrigation water rights usually disagree about the quantity of
return flows, with the irrigators claiming higher return flows and the water
rights purchasers claiming higher water consumption and lower return flows.
Resolving this issue in water right transfer administrative proceedings is
expensive (lawyers and engineers must be employed), time consuming, and
controvcrsial. Nonetheless, water rights sales are an efficient method for
reallocating limited water supplies as economic conditions change.
Water Exchanges. The purchase of irrigation water rights by a
municipality or industry needing additional water supplies is the typical water
rights transfer setting. Another example is a water exchange, where water in
one location is substituted for water in another location. For example, a
municipality may construct a storage reservoir and then trade the water
stored for water controlled by an irrigation district in another location. The
municipality is, in effect, trading new stored water for the old irrigation
water. Such water exchanges sometimes allow water to be acquired at a lower
cost than would otherwise be possible.
Water Marketing. An emerging aspect of water rights transfers is water
marketing. Reservoirs are expensive to build and are often controversial
because of their adverse environmental impacts. Some suggest that purchas-
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ing water rights allows new water uses to be accommodated at a lower Cost
than would be possible with reservoir construction, and does so with virtually
no adverse environmental impact. Those promoting water marketing seek to
make the process for buying or leasing water rights more expeditious to
facilitate these market transfers.
Western State Water Rights Transfer Policies. Virtually all western
states authorize the sale of water rights. Several western states are taking
additional steps to make water rights transfers easier through water market_
ing programs. This is particularly true in states that are experiencing urban
or industrial growth. Water marketing programs include: establishing a state
clearinghouse for water rights sales to provide potential water rights buyers
and sellers an opportunity to obtain information regarding water rights sales;
adopting new procedures to streamline the water rights transfer process; and
streamlining the sale of water rights from state and federal irrigation
projects. A new type of professional, the water broker, has emerged as one
who can assist municipalities and industries in buying water rights.
Nebraska Water Rights Transfer Policies. Traditionally, Nebraska has
been one of the few western states that does not allow water rights to be
transferred. If a municipality or industry needs a secure water supply, it can
usually obtain one through a well or well field in most areas of Nebraska with
little difficulty and relatively low cost. Thus, although most streams are overappropriated, abundant groundwater supplies have made it unnecessary to
reallocate water rights through market transfers to accommodate new
municipal and industrial uses.
In 1983, the longstanding prohIbition against selling water rights was
modified to allow surface-water appropriations to be sold for use within the
same river basin and for the same purpose as the original appropriation. But,
although water rights transfers are allowed, prohibiting the purchase of
irrigation water rights for municipal or industrial purposes severely restricts
the water rights market in Nebraska.
Summary. Nebraska's pre-Sporhase water export policies were similar to
those of other states in making water exports difficult to accomplish.
Nebraska's water rights transfer policies differ from those of other western
states in that Nebraska statutes do not allow the buying and selling of water
rights except within the same river basin, for the same use. This restrictive
policy has not hampered economic development in Nebraska, as ample
groundwater supplies are generally available throughout the state to supply
new municipal or industrial uses. Other wcstern states do not have this
luxury, and therefore must allow municipalities or industries to purchase
water rights from irrigators in order to obtain water needed for economic
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development and population growth, Water right transfers reduce the
quantity of water used in irrigation, reducing potential agricultural production. Administrative proceedings for approving water rights transfers are
often expensive and controversial, as irrigators and water rights buyers
dispute the effect of the proposed change in use on return flows.
The Sporhase deci<;ion has forced western states, including Nebraska, to
modify restrictive policies on water exports. Because water export is a
politically sensitive issue, this effect of Sporhase has been controversial in the
West. The impact of Sporhase on water rights transfers also means that in
states where water rights can be transferred, those water rights can now be
purchased for use out of state. In Nebraska, where water rights transfers are
tightly restricted, more liberal water rights transfer policies could lead to
Nebraska surface water rights being purchased for out-of-state use.

The Sporhase Decision
The Sporhase decision began simply, although its results would
revolutionize western water law and politics. Mr. Sporhase owned a farm
straddling the Nebraska-Colorado border in southwestern Nebraska and
used a well located in Nebraska to irrigate hi<; land in both states. Legally,
Sporhase was required to obtain a permit from the Nebraska Department of
Water Resources to import Nebraska groundwater into Colorado. Sporhase
did not seek a groundwater export permit, however, because he knew the
permit would be denied on the grounds of reciprocity: the Nebraska statute
required that Colorado allow groundwater exports from Colorado to
Nebraska, and Colorado statutes explicitly prohibited all water exports.

The Sporhase decision began simply, although its
results would revolutionize western water law and politics.
The state of Nebraska sued Sporhase for failing to obtain a groundwater
export permit. Sporhase argued that the reciprocity provision of the export
statute violated the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. Under the
commerce clause, courts may invalidate state legislation restricting interstate
commerce unless the restriction is only incidental to accomplishing a
legitimate local purpose. The state of Nebraska argued that the export
statute was constitutional. The Nebraska Supreme Court ruled in 1981 that
groundwater was publicly owned, that groundwater was not an article of
commerce because it could not be transferred freely, and therefore
groundwater was not subject to the commerce clause. The court also ruled
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that Sporhase could not continue to export water into Colorado without a
state permit, in effect requiring Sporhase to stop his interstate irrigation
until Colorado adopted a reciprocity provision. Chief Justice KrivoSha
dissented on the basis that the reciprocity requirement did violate the
commerce clause.

u.s. Supreme Court Decision
The u.s. Supreme Court reversed the Nebraska Supreme Court decision
in 1982, reversing earlier decisions of its own that water export bans were
constitutional as well (Nebraska ex reI Douglas v. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 941
[1982]). In prior decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court had ruled that state
water export bans did not violate the commerce clause, but this rule was
discarded in Sporhase as being inconsistent with more recent court interpre_
tations of the commerce clause. The court ruled instead that water was an
article of commerce, and therefore any export prohibitions were subject to
the commerce clause.
The U.S. Supreme Court indicated the legal test it would use to determine whether a state statute restricting interstate commerce was constitutionally valid was as follows:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes
one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend
on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted with a
lesser impact on interstate activities (458 U.S. at 954 [1982]).

Thus, some regulation of water exports is legally permissible, but the regulation must be for a legitimate local public purpose and the effects on
interstate commerce must be only incidental.
The court then suggested some circumstances in which export restrictions might be valid. First, the court recognized that states may regulate the
use of water in times and places of water shortage to protect public health.
Second, the court suggested that the public ownership of groundwater in
Nebraska may support a limited water use preference for its citizens. Unfortunately, the court did not expand on this limited instate preference, so its
meaning is unclear. Finally, the court stated that citizens' use of water saved
through regulatory efforts (for example, to control groundwater depletion)
may be preferred during times of shortage. The court stated that three parts
of Nebraska's export statutes met these standards. These requirements were
that the proposed export of groundwater was reasonable, not contrary to the
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conservation and use of groundwater, and not otherwise detrimental to the
public welfare.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that while some restrictions on
exports might be consistent with the commerce clause, the Nebraska
reciprocity requirement could not be justified legally unless Nebraska could
demonstrate that: (1) the state as a whole suffered a water shortage; (2)
instate water transfers from areas of abundance to areas of shortage were
feasible without regard to distance; and (3) water imports from adjoining
states would compensate for water exports to those states. Nebraska made
nO attempt to argue that this was the case, and therefore the reciprocity
clause was invalidated.
The court further suggested that an arid state might be able to legally
justify a ban on all exports if it could demonstrate that all water resources
were needed for instatc usc, although the court also declared that states cannot practice economic protectionism in making water allocation decisions.
Finally, thc court determined that any restrictions a state imposes on instate
water uses may also be extended to water exports, such as controls to prevent
groundwater depletion.
Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor dissented on the basis that Nebraska
law does not allow transfer of groundwater to adjoining land for irrigation
purposes, and, therefore, that the reciprocity clause did not result in
different treatment of export uses and instate uses in this case. However, that
was an incorrect legal premise. While Nebraska court decisions on this point
are not dear, the Upper Republican Natural Resources District, within
which Sporhase's well was located, did and continues to allow irrigation
transfers to adjoining land with NRD approval as part of its local
groundwater control regulations.
After the Sporhase decision, the Nebraska Supreme Court ruled that the
remainder of the export permit statute was still in force, although the
reciprocity provision had been invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court. Mr.
Sporhase obtained a groundwater export permit from the Nebra.,ka Department of Water Resources and i., irrigating his Colorado field from his
Nebra<;ka well.
In response to Sporhase, the Ncbraska Unicameral in 1984 amended the
export statute to require the DWR director to consider in each export case:
•

Whcther the proposed groundwater export is a beneficial use of
groundwater,
• lbe alternative surface or groundwater supplies available to the
applicant,
• Any negative impacts of the export on local surface or groundwater
supplies to meet reasonable future local water demands, and
• Any other factors to protect the interest of Nebraska and its citizens.
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In addition, the groundwater export must comply with local natural resource
district groundwater regulations.

Commentary
The purposes of the commerce clause were best expressed by Justice
Robert Jackson in 1949:
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and eve'1'
craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free aCCess
to every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his exports, and
no foreign state will by customs duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise every COnsumer may look to free competition from every producing area in the Nation to protect
him from exploitation by any. Such was the vision of the Founders; such has been the
doctrine of this Court which has given it reality (H.P. Hood & Sons Inc. v. DuMond
336 U.S. 535 [1949]).
'

The purpose of the commerce clause, then, is to ensure that states do not
embargo, unfairly tax, or otherwise discriminate against the products of
other states to protect instate producers.

Under a literal reading of Sporhase, the state could not
limit or prohibit the export unless the restrictions or
prohibitions applied to similar instate uses, were the
result of local water shortages, or fell within the

u.s. Supreme Court's undefined "limited instate preference."
In the water rights context, the commerce clause seems to require states
allowing water or water rights to be bought and sold within a state to allow
them to be bought and sold across state lines on the same basis. If the
Sporhase decision were so limited, it would still have a major impact on west·
ern water rights but a lesser impact on Nebraska, where water rights
generally cannot be transferred. However, the U.S. Supreme Court went
beyond this and ruled that when a state is making an initial water allocation
(that is, initially granting the water right), it cannot discriminate economi·
cally against out-of-state water users. This part of the Sporhase decision
seems to extend beyond the requirements of a strict reading of the commerce
clause.
The principal disadvantage of the Sporhase decision is that it gives faster
developing states an advantage over slower developing states. For example, a
growing city may seek additional water supplies from a neighboring state to
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upply an expanding population and economy. Prior to Sporhase, the neigh-

~oring state could have prohibited or limited the water export, reserving the
water for use by its future expanding population and economy. Under a
literal reading of Sporhase, however, the state could not limit or prohibit the
export unless the restrictions or prohibitions applied to similar instate uses,
were the result of local water shortages, or fell within the U.S. Supreme
Court's undefined "limited instate preference."

The New Mexico Response
The only further court interpretation of the Sporhase decision involves
efforts of EI Paso, Texas, to import water from New Mexico. New Mexico's
original water export statute was invalidated on the basis of Sporhase, but
new export legislation was sustained as meeting the Sporhase requirements.
New Mexico has gone further than any other state in attempting to comply
with the Sporhase decision. An examination of the New Mexico experience is
worthwhile in evaluating Nebraska's water export policy alternatives.
El Paso I. EI Paso determined that it needed additional water supplies to
meet the needs of a growing population, and it applied in 1980 for water
appropriations to install 326 wells in New Mexico to annually withdraw
2%,000 acre-feet of groundwater. The appropriations were initially denied
by the New Mexico state engineer, based on New Mexico's statutory
groundwater export prohibition. EI Paso appealed that decision in federal
court, arguing that New Mexico's water export prohibition was unconstitutional.
After the Sporhase decision was handed down, the federal district judge
ruled in El Paso I that the New Mexico water export prohibition statute was
unconstitutional, as it interfered with interstate commerce (EI Paso v.
Reynolds, 563 F.Supp. 379 [1983]). The court noted that while New Mexico
had long been engaged in state regulatory efforts to manage and conserve
groundwater supplies (regulations much more stringent than those found in
Nebraska), that alone was not sufficient to justify the export prolnl>ition.
The court ruled that Sporhase allowed a state to discriminate in favor of its
citizens in water allocation only to the extent necessary to protect human
health and safety needs; beyond that, water must be treated as any other
natural resource. New Mexico did not argue that its embargo was necessary
to protect human health and safety but rather that its purpose was to make
maximum beneficial use of the water in New Mexico. Despite the fact that
state water officials projected a significant statewide water shortage by 2020,
the court noted that the uses contributing to the deficit included industry,
irrigation, energy production, fish and wildlife, and recreation, and
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determined that water could not be reserved for these purposes beyond the
state's health and safety needs.
The court suggested that New Mexico could engage in water planning
and that export uses could be regulated on the same basis as instate USes.
New Mexico could condition export permits with reporting or other require_
ments to determine whether the water was being used properly. The COUrt
stated that if EI Paso violated any permit conditions, New Mexico COuld
revoke the export permits and shut down EI Paso's well field.
Among the difficulties with El Paso I are the ambiguities inherent in
Sporhase. Parts of the Sporhase decision seem to indicate that states may
favor their citizens in water allocation decisions only to protect water uses
necessary for human health and safety, but not for economic development.
Other passages of Sporhase, however, suggest that states may engage in a
limited preference for instate water uses; but these passages do not define
what this limited preference encompasses. The strictest interpretation of the
limited-preferences language was adopted by the El Paso I court to mean a
preference limited to human health and safety needs but not economic
development. However, the limited preference language could also mean a
limited preference for instate economic development. Commentators have
criticized El Paso I for interpreting the limited preference language so
narrowly (Trelcase 1987; Liepas 1984).
Sporhase at least admits the possibility that a state may economically
discriminate in favor of local economic development, so long as that
discrimination does not unduly burden interstate commerce. This could
include considering the economic benefits to the state of proposed uses and
authorizing only those uses resulting in a net state economic benefit. Water
exports would have few economic benefits in the exporting state and therefore would be expected to fail such an economic benefits test. The extent of
this type of limited preference has not been addressed by the Supreme Court,
although the federal district court did acknowledge its existence in El Paso II.
SB 295 and the Export Study Commission. After El Paso I, the 1983
New Mexico legislature enacted Senate Bill (SB) 295, which incorporated
the features of Nebraska's export statutes found permissible in Sporhase.
Specifically, in considering surface or groundwater export appropriation
applications, the New Mexico state engineer could grant the permit only if
the proposed export would not:
•
•
•

Impair existing rights,
Be contrary to the conservation of water within the state, or
Be otherwise detrimental to the public welfare of New Mexico
citizens.
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In making these determinations the state engineer's considerations were
specified to include:
•
•
•
•

The availability of water in New Mexico,
Demands for water in New Mexico,
New Mexico water shortages,
Whether the water proposed to be exported could be transferred to
alleviate shortages in New Mexico,
• Alternative water supplies available to the applicant, and
• The demands placed on the applicant'S local water sources.

In 1983, the New Mexico legislature also established a water law study
committee to make recommendations regarding water exports law and
policy. The committee presented its report to the legislature January 1, 1984.
The committee report noted that New Mexico was facing a water shortage,
but that surrounding states (Texas, Arizona, Colorado and Oklahoma) were
facing much greater water shortages. Thus, New Mexico likely would have to
contend with export requests from these states. The committee recommended several alternatives:
• Requcst federal legislation giving states the legal authority to restrict
exports (essentially repealing Sporhase),
• Enter into an interstate compact with Texas to apportion New
Mexico's groundwater between the two states,
• Study the possibility of New Mexico's appropriating all unappropriated water to itself in order to make the water unavailable for
export, or
• Enact a five-year moratorium on groundwater appropriations to study
the available supply and provide a basis for better groundwater
management.
Based on the study commission's recommendations, another statute was
enacted in 1984 establishing a two-year moratorium on groundwater
appropriations from the aquifer in which El Paso was interested. The
moratorium would provide time to develop additional information regarding
the groundwater supplies, thus permitting a better evaluation of the impact
of the proposed export appropriations.
El Paso n. El Paso challenged the constitutionality of the revised New
Mexico groundwater export statute and moratorium statute in federal court.
In El Paso 1I, the court ruled that the state engineer's consideration of the
welfare of New Mexico's citizens in evaluating water exports was not
inherently discriminatory (El Paso v. Reynolds, 597 F.Supp. 694 [1984]).
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Citing Sporhase, the court declared that states could not limit exports merel
to protect local economic interests, although the health of a state's economY
has a direct bearing on its public welfare. However, the court further stat~
that in Sporhase the U.S. Supreme Court did not equate health and safe
requirements with the public welfare. This suggests that there may be somty
latitude to protect instate water uses other than simply protecting pUbUe
health and safety on the one hand and blatant discrimination in favor of loca~
economic water uses on the other.
The court also suggested that a state need not wait until water shortages
have occurred to begin conservation efforts. An export statute could take
potential shortages into account and be constitutional. The real test would
be whether the administrative application of that statute by the state
engineer was constitutional.

Perhaps the most significant aspect ofEl Paso II is that
the court recognized that a state's limited preference
for instate uses could extend beyond health
and safety considerations.
The court then considered the groundwater appropriation moratorium
and concluded that it applied only to the groundwater basins for which EI
Paso was seeking export appropriations. The court also concluded that the
purpose of the moratorium was to block those export appropriations rather
than to gather information to improve groundwater administration. Accordingly, the court invalidated the moratorium as interfering with interstate
commerce.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of El Paso II is that the court recognized that a state's limited preference for instate uses could extend beyond
health and safety considerations. The court did not recognize this in El Paso
I. El Paso II also warns that actions taken to prevent water from being
exported will be closely scrutinized to determine whether they comply with
Sporhase, and will be invalidated if they have no justification other than
protectionism.
After El Paso II, the New Mexico state engineer considered the EI Paso
export appropriation application. On December 28, 1987, the state engineer
denied the application on the basis that EI Paso did not have a need for the
water within the next forty years. EI Paso has appealed this ruling to federal
court, where the case is now pending.
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The Nebraska Response
The immediate reaction in Nebraska to the 1982 Sporhase decision was to
dify the groundwater export statutes to give the director of the Depart1110nt of Water Resources greater discretion in making groundwater export
l11~mit decisions. A more controversial response came in the 1987 legislative
~:ssion, when two bills were introduced to study water exports and to
uthorize the state to encourage water transfers, water rights transfers, and
:ater exports. These bills were controversial and were opposed by agri, ultural and environmental groups alike. As a compromise, the export study
C rovisions were enacted and the more controversial water transfer and sale
~rovisions dropped. The water transfers study will propose legislation to the
1989 Unicameral on how best to implement the more controversial features
of the original water transfer and sale bill.
LB 146 and LB 151. In 1987, two water transfer and exports bills were
sponsored by Senator Loran Schmit, chairman of the Unicameral's
Committee on Natural Resources and leading water resources senator in the
Unicameral. The first bill, Legislative Bill (LB) 146, would have:
• Directed the Nebraska Water Management Board, an interagency
board responsible for reviewing and promoting large water projects in
Nebraska, to identify and pursue water projects involving instate
water transfers, water exports, instate water rights sales, and export
water rights sales.
• Directed the board to prepare a study of water sales, water rights
transfers, interbasin transfers, and exports for legislative consideration. The study was to:
- Identify potential sources of water and water rights for transfer and
export;
- Identify potential buyers and markets for Nebraska's water; and
- Suggest alternatives for handling damages resulting from water
sales, interbasin transfers, water rights transfers, and exports.
•

•

Made surface water rights freely transferable between river basins and
among uses, including instream uses. (Currently surface water
appropriations may not be transferred between river basins or among
different uses.)
Repealed the requirement of legislative approval for surface water
export appropriations and replaced it with considerations similar to
those added to the groundwater export statute. Surface water export

